COOPERATION OF FORMER SOVIET UNION COUNTRIES AND UKRAINE WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

COOPERACIÓN DE LOS ANTIGUOS PAÍSES SOVIÉTICOS Y UCRANIA CON LA UNIÓN EUROPEA


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RESUMEN
Este documento se centra en el desarrollo de enfoques conceptuales relacionados con la intensificación de la cooperación militar y política de los países de la antigua Unión Soviética del este y Ucrania con la Unión Europea. La metodología de la investigación se basa en la aplicación de enfoques de investigación sistemática al estudio del sistema de relaciones internacionales. El estudio se refiere a los problemas de cooperación entre Ucrania y la Unión Europea. Nuestro hallazgo muestra que Ucrania debería decidir sobre la posibilidad de crear un sindicato interestatal de defensa y seguridad "Intermarium" con sus vecinos, los estados miembros de la UE y la OTAN.
Palabras clave: Intermarium, proyecto geopolítico, multilateralismo, geopolítica neoimperial, cordón sanitario

ABSTRACT
This paper is focused on the development of conceptual approaches concerning the intensification of the military and political cooperation of eastern former Soviet Union countries and Ukraine with the European Union. The methodology of the research is based on the application of systematic research approaches to the analysis of the system of international relations. The analysis relates on the problems of cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union. Our finding shows that Ukraine should decide on the possibility of creating an inter-state defense and security union "Intermarium" with its neighbors - EU member states and NATO.
Keywords: Intermarium, geopolitical project, multilateralism, neo-Imperial geopolitics, cordon sanitaire.

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INTRODUCTION

After gaining its independence, Ukraine, together with Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey and Iran, became one of the five geostrategic centers of the world. The peculiarity of these states is that their geopolitical significance is primarily due to their location (the ability to control access to important areas or refuse geo-strategic players in obtaining resources), and in some cases also the ability to play the role of a defense shield for individual states or even the region. Brzezinski emphasized that the individual peculiarity of Ukraine lies in the fact that without it, Russia will not be able to restore the empire (Brzezinski, 1997). In addition, Russia cannot be in Europe if Ukraine is not there, while Ukraine cannot enter Europe if there is no Russia (Brzezinski, 1997). This pattern, as well as the military and economic potential that Ukraine possessed at the time of its recognition as a sovereign state, gave it a hypothetical chance to claim not only the role of one of the geostrategic centers but also to join a circle of geostrategic players, which made it a potential focus of tension between Russia and the West.The main goal of this article titled “Cooperation of Former Soviet Union Countries and Ukraine with the European Union” is the development of conceptual approaches concerning the intensification of the military and political cooperation of eastern former Soviet Union countries and Ukraine with the European Union.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSES OF UKRAINE

The main efforts of independent Ukraine in the field of foreign policy were aimed at gaining membership in the Council of Europe, the EU and NATO. The European choice is an integral part of a national idea and at the same time a strategic direction of Ukraine's development. Already in the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of December 25, 1990, the government was instructed to focus efforts to ensure Ukraine's direct participation in the European process and European structures (Verkhovnoi, as quoted in Umland 2017).

The Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine (Section IX) provided the principle that Ukraine is a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs (non-aligned status), based on the fact of deployment on the territory of Russia's military units, Ukraine could not be regarded as a permanently neutral state, but only as a non-aligned one (Yakoviuk, 2017).

On November 16, 1994, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a decision on Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, subject to the provision of security guarantees by the nuclear-weapon States. On December 5, 1994, a memorandum on security guarantees was signed in Budapest in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, according to which Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom provided Ukraine with security guarantees.

The mistakes made by the Ukrainian leadership in the 1990's on defense and national security were largely due to mistreatment of the estimates of the state and prospects of state-legal development of the Russian Federation. In the expert environment, the prevailing view was that, firstly, Russia entered the stage of the collapse of the internal belt of the Moscow Empire, which develops in the form of direct anticolonial wars and protest, as well as in the form of national-liberation wars, and can eventually lead to the formation of new sovereign states (Ichkeria, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Ural and Far Eastern republics, etc.), and secondly, the formation of a single Russian empire that will be marketable is not possible (Soskin, 2018).

At the same time, it was thought that Russia has too many problems of its own to initiate separatism in Ukraine. In addition, it has to rely so much on the interests of the West, so as not to oppose it directly in fundamental issues. And, of course, the independent state of Ukraine must be taken into account (Tanchyn, 2000). In 1993, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Resolution "On Main Directions of Foreign Policy of Ukraine" (Tarasiuk, 2000).

In the Resolution, the Parliament noted that taking into account the fundamental changes that took place after the collapse of the USSR, the declared intention of Ukraine to become a neutral and non-aligned state in the future should be adapted to new conditions and cannot be considered an obstacle to its full participation in the pan-European security structure. NATO's attribution to the "pan-European security structure" was explained by the fact that the Recommendations of the Parliamentary Hearings on Ukraine-NATO Relations and Cooperation noted that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the heart of a new architecture for pan-European security (Tarasiuk, 2000).

This fact can be explained in a certain way by the fact that in accordance with the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada "On Main Directions of Foreign Policy of Ukraine", each border state was recognized as Ukraine's strategic partner (Domashenko, 2008).

Under these conditions, the existence of an unsettled conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova; the unresolved issue of delineation of the state border of the Black Sea and Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait; the absence of demarcation of the state border of Ukraine with the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Moldova; the existence of unresolved issues related to the temporary stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine, the imperfection of the contractual framework in this area was considered not as a *threat*, but only as a direct external *challenge* to the national security of Ukraine.

It should be noted that Ukraine's mistakes regarding the definition of external threats to national security, as well as the definition of strategic partners, to some

extent were due to geopolitical considerations, as well as failures of key geopolitical players, primarily the United States.

Because of the contradictions between strategic understanding and strategic ignorance about what was happening on the territory of the CIS, many Western experts, in particular. Huntington believed that:

Firstly, Ukraine should not be a NATO member because Russia would accept it as a hostile act; according to Brzezinski, the question of the final choice of Ukraine for its development vector should have appeared only after 10 years (Brzezinski, 2000). At the same time, the politician noted, that this choice would be difficult for the political elite who used to “sit on two chairs”. As a result, Z. Brzezinski pointed out that until such a decision was taken, it would be possible in the extreme case, it may be necessary to involve the military, which is the “state institution that one can (and may have to) do what the military has done in Turkey and Brazil at one time” (Brzezinski, 2000, p64).

It should be noted that (Abisheva, Zagorodnyaya and Bekturganov, 2018, Shestopal, Oleynikov and Yakovyuk 2017, Yuriy, and Bytyak 2017) quite rightly pointed out that the political leadership of Ukraine was not able to make the final choice for the vector of state development. But at the same time, it made a mistake in choosing the subject who would make this choice: in Ukraine, not an army and special services, but the civil society institutions were the driving force in the revolutionary events of February 2014, which led not only to the removal from power of V.Yanukovych and his team, but also to change the foreign policy vector of the development of the state, which caused a radical overview of the Strategy of National Security of Ukraine.

The purpose of development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the beginning of the XXI century was to increase the role of the EU in the security sphere, which preserves the leading position of the Union in the issue of the effective use of soft power, as well as the gradual decline of the military and political dependence of European countries on the US and NATO in the field of security and defense.

In 2005, the European Union adopted another document - the European Consensus on Development (The European Consensus on Development, 2006). Significantly, both in the European Security Strategy and the European consensus, it was emphasized that sustainable development is impossible without a peaceful and secure environment, and a lasting peace is impossible without the development and eradication of poverty.

Therefore, there is a strong link between development and other policies, including peace and security, humanitarian aid, migration, the environment and climate change. This thesis will be subsequently reproduced in the Global Strategy for the

European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, presented in June 2016 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy.

Having been aware of the strategic importance of the EU-Ukraine relations, France, presiding in the EU, represented by President N. Sarkozy, and President of Ukraine V.A.Yuschenko decided during the Paris Summit to give a decisive impetus to the development of relations between the parties.

Although the parties did not bring up possible accession of Ukraine to the EU once again, the European Union recognized the European aspirations of Ukraine and welcomed its European choice.

In this regard it is appropriate to recall the situation with the efforts of the countries of the Vise grad Group in the early 1990's to obtain associate membership in NATO. In an effort to acquire the security guarantees of the country's as soon as possible Visegrád Group in 1992 raised the question of the possibility to obtain the associate membership in NATO.

However, the introduction of a special associate membership mechanism for the countries of the region, which would not provide full guarantees of armed protection from the Alliance, could divide Europe from the security point of view on the first and second-rate states. Adoption in NATO of only the most trained countries (members of the Vise grad Group) would inevitably cause a chain reaction of similar requirements from other Central and Eastern Europe countries (including the former Soviet republics).

THE SECURITY POLICY OF UKRAINE IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRANIAN CONFLICT

The conflict with Russia revealed the crisis situation of the national security and defense system, its unwillingness to independently ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. Given the possibility of Russia's open actions within the conflict in Ukraine, which resulted from the decision of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the possibility of using the armed forces of Russia on the territory of Ukraine in 2014, the effectiveness of the modern security and defense system of Ukraine to a large extent depends on the preservation of the sanction mechanism applied to Russia primarily from USA and EU, as well as mediation between France and Germany in the Normandy format. However, the further preservation of these levers becomes more and more problematic: firstly, Russia's conservation of the situation in the East leads to a gradual disintegration of the position of the EU member states towards Ukraine due to the growing tiredness of the European Union on Ukrainian issues, as well as the absence of additional weighty arguments in favor of continuation or strengthening secondly, the victory of D. Trump at the presidential election gave rise to a confrontation within the American political class and led to a significant fluctuation of foreign policy rate.

In March 2014, the Verkhovna Rada appealed to the US Congress to grant Ukraine the status of a main ally outside NATO. In December 2014, the US Senate supported the «Act of Support of Freedom in Ukraine 2014» on providing Ukraine with arms and ally status without NATO membership. However, the bill did not come into force, as it was not approved by the House of Representatives and signed by the President of the United States Barak Obama.

One of the possible formats of such cooperation was announced by the former head of the Security Service of Ukraine Smeshko, offering the implementation of the «Intermarium» project, which since the mid-1990s was consistently defended and popularized in Ukraine by Soskin (Soskin, 2018). He advocated the idea of creating by Ukraine, together with Poland, of the Baltic-Black Sea Economic Alliance as an analogue of ASEAN, which would help to adapt the countries of the Baltic Sea to the needs of the European Union in the socio-economic sphere, as well as to become a guarantee of the irreversibility of changes in the post-Soviet space (Soskin, 2018).

The strengthening of relations between Ukraine and Poland with strategically important neighbors (Poland, Turkey, the Baltic states, Central and South-Eastern Europe, Transcaucasia region) was considered as a factor capable of contributing to the formation of a «belt of stability» and of regional security structures from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Caspian Sea.

Close cooperation and cooperation with the countries of Central Europe and the possibility and the expediency of deepening of cooperation between the countries of the Baltic-Black Sea Region were always considered by the political authority of Ukraine. Thus, in February 1993, the President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk made an initiative in Budapest to create a zone of stability and security in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, which was the basis for the project to create a Central Eastern European space of stability and security (Bytiak and Yakoviuk, 2017).

Despite the fact that the idea of forming an inter-state association «Intermarium» is discussed at the highest political level of both individual states and the European community; this problem has not been thoroughly studied by Ukrainian scientists, and as a result, the conclusions formulated in domestic publications are insufficiently substantiated. Therefore, there are no well-founded assessments of this project, and the public is practically unaware of its content. In these conditions, it is not surprising that the electronic petition of Kostyantyn Zholkiewicz posted on the 2nd of June 2016 on the website of the President of Ukraine, on the support of the establishment of the Baltic-Black Sea Confederation of Lithuania, Poland, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, and on recognition of this idea as the official and public strategic aim of Ukraine obtained only 42 votes (Baranovskyi, 2010).

Special attention is paid to this project in Poland, where the idea of creating a

military-political association «Intermarium» replaced the concept of parallelism, which was supported by Presidents Lech Valensa (idea of the Black Sea-Baltic axis NATO bis), Lech Kaczynski and Andrzej Duda, and according to which Poland should no longer be a «buffer zone», but should become the eastern wing of NATO.

The support of Poland for the project may be explained primarily by the concern about Merkel's statement: «Our common goal must be the return of Germany to the leadership of Europe» (Baranovskyi, 2010).

By contrast, the German experts (f. ex. Andreas Umland) are skeptical about the project, considering the possibility of transforming Poland into a regional leader, which can limit the influence of Germany in the EU and the Eastern European region, and therefore does not correspond to its national interests (Umland, 2017).

This argument is not meaningless because the formation of a military-political regional union under the aegis of Poland will allow it to gain a critical geopolitical mass, will automatically grant it the status of a regional state and will allow it to interact on a qualitatively new level both with France and Germany within the EU, and with Russia. At the same time, it should be noted that the Caspian oil factor makes the European Union increasingly frequently consider the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region as a kind of supporting structure of the geopolitical space of the EU, in comparison with the Baltic-Black Sea region (Umland, 2017).

At the same time, it would be wrong to say that the «Intermarium» is a foreign geopolitical project. In fact, the possibility of deepening the military-political cooperation of the countries of the Baltic-Black Sea region by creating a confederation aimed at protecting against aggression from Russia (and to a certain extent also from Germany), at the level of the idea in 1918-1934, was raised both by foreign Józef Pilsudski's Intermarium project; Carl Mannerheim and Rudolf Holsti –Baltic union; ZigfrīdsMeierovics – Baltic-Black Sea Union; Józef Beck's «Third Europe»; Giedroyc–Mieroszewski doctrine; WładysławSikorski– The Polish-Czechoslovak federation) and Ukrainian (MykhailoHrushevsky – The Baltic-Black Sea alliance; StepanRudnytsky –

CONCLUSIONS

The main efforts of independent Ukraine in the field of foreign policy were aimed at gaining membership in the Council of Europe, the EU and NATO. At the same time, the problem of increasing the defense capacity did not apply to the priorities of state policy. As a result, the security situation in Ukraine is the worst among the republics of the former USSR, since internal political weaknesses and security challenges of Ukraine were with a radical overhaul of the international security system. The international security system that emerged after the Second World War, as well as the guarantees that Ukraine received as a result of the Budapest memorandum, are not valid, and state institutions responsible for security failed to

confront the new threats that arose as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

The mistakes made by the Ukrainian administration in the 1990s with regard to the definition of external threats to national security were largely due to miscalculations in the assessment of the state and prospects for the state-legal development of the Russian Federation (it was considered that Russia had too many own problems to initiate separatism in Ukraine), geopolitical considerations, as well as miscalculations by the USA and the EU.

NATO and the European Union are the basic security institutions in the Euro-Atlantic area. After the cessation of the Organization of the Warsaw Treaty and the collapse of the USSR, these organizations were in the center of the process of transforming the European security system. An important factor in the development of this process was the desire of the former socialist countries and republics of the USSR, in particular Ukraine, to gain membership in them with the aim of participating in the system of collective security in Europe.

The NATO Partnership for Peace program, as well as the Common Security and Defense Policy, are specific security tools aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of third countries (for example, Ukraine). In particular, the object of their influence in third countries is the security sector.

The reluctance of joining Ukraine to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures in the early 1990's was due primarily to the confrontation between Moscow and Washington, as well as the lack of unity in the views on the prospects of Ukraine's membership in NATO among the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The efficiency of the modern security and defense system of Ukraine depends considerably on the preservation of the sanction mechanism applied to Russia, primarily by the United States and the EU, as well as the mediation of France and Germany in the Norman format.

A key security interest of Ukraine is the search for ways of its participation in the system of collective security in Europe, together with the deepening of cooperation in the military-political sphere with the EU as a whole, as well as its individual members, first of all with Poland. In the latter case, Ukraine should decide on the possibility of creating an inter-state defense and security union "Intermarium" with its neighbors - EU member states and NATO.

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