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NATIONAL MEMORY AND TRADITIONAL TYPE IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN SOCIAL DYNAMICS

MEMORIA NACIONAL Y TIPO TRADICIONAL EN EL CONTEXTO DE LA DINÁMICA SOCIAL MODERNA







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RESUMEN
La investigación actual se llevó a cabo con el propósito de examinar el lugar de la memoria nacional y la cultura tradicional en el enfoque filosófico y político de la teoría de la civilización moderna en Rusia. La metodología de investigación fue analítico-judicial. Los resultados mostraron que en todos los niveles en Rusia, se pueden distinguir los símbolos y caracteres culturales y patrióticos. También se hizo evidente que muchos de los personajes y figuras contemporáneos o incluso legendarios han sobrevivido en la memoria histórica de los rusos, sin embargo, el valor de esta memoria histórica no se puede expresar con certeza porque su interpretación está cambiando con el tiempo.
Palabras clave: memoria nacional, ideología política, memorias colectivas, dominantes nacionales.

ABSTRACT
The current research was conducted with the purpose of examining place of national memory and traditional culture in the philosophical and political approach of the theory of modern civilization in Russia. Research methodology was analytical-judicial. The results showed that at all levels in Russia, cultural and patriotic symbols and characters can be distinguished. It also became evident that many of the contemporary or even legendary characters and figures have survived in the historical memory of Russian people, however the value of this historical memory cannot be expressed with certainty because its interpretation is changing over time.
Keywords: national memory, political ideology, collective memories, national dominants.

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INTRODUCTION

The field of collective memory studies in sociology is a new topic in comparison with other classical discourses. In general, history of stating a problem and thoughts related to human memory date back to the classical period of philosophy in ancient Greece. In the field of psychology, empirical research on memory has been introduced in the new era. Considering the social and cultural context of the formation of memory patterns is a novel step taken in the twentieth century. In highlighting the historical sections as group collective memory, along with the social elements such as the place of generation, and the degree and type of formal education, the contemporary identity system of individuals is of prime importance. In Durkheim's approach, memory discourse is not used solely to explain past events, but rather is considered as a strategic source of sustainable identity for the present. Durkheim explains memory exclusively in relation to traditional societies; societies seeking to safeguard sacred memories of their origins. Individuals' affiliations to national, ethnic, family, occupational, and religious communities determine their identity framework. From the angle of their identity base, they rebuild their historical past. This rebuilding is directly related to his current identity system.

It is difficult to overestimate a role of memory, tradition and historical and cultural heritage in formation of national identity. According to Renan (1902) Essence of the nation in that all individuals had much in common that all of them forgot a lot of things. Any Frenchman does not know Burgundy he, Alan or the Visigoth: any citizen of France *has to forget* the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, murders in the south in the 13th century (Renan as quoted in Panarin, 2006).

Oblivion, concerning the past, apparently, characterizes the Russian relation to the past more - in any case, in stable times whereas during an era of sweeping sociocultural changes, times of "national unconsciousness" even what was not because "successor" or the carrier of memory practically disappears, first of all, in spiritual and cultural sense is remembered. The problem of formation of national memory, a role of historical and cultural heritage in processes of formation of national identity, revival of tradition during an era of social changes are urgent in modern Russia more than ever earlier. In the conditions of radical marginalization of ideology of nationalism (emergence of the Ukrainian neo-Nazism), its tool use in collision of the states - civilizations - the culture, tradition, history become mechanisms of the constructive/destructive address with the past therefore it is very important to put truly a comma in a line *«to remember» «it is impossible» «to forget»* concerning symbolical figures of memory, historical events and commemorative practices.

The legend about the past, the tradition, stability of the general memoirs and defaults of the nation are formed quite long time. To change memory of the past, to erase completely memory of separate events, people - not always works well and

to that there are powerful reasons. Historical dates - the Independence Day in the USA, Day of the Bastille in France, the Crowning in England, Day of remembrance of the Holocaust in Israel, the Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War in Russia - are steady in national memory. Change of memory of similar events is impossible; their oblivion will lead to destruction of the carrier of memory and the state. As well as creation of new memorable dates without serious conceptual justification does not promote emergence of steady memories, patriotic unity and solidarity of the nation. In general various in traditions of the people is an address with the past, its actualization, perception of cultural heritage as way of inheritance of tradition, originality of forms of organized and national patriotic memory.

Sometimes in the history, the ideology designing the civil nation advanced its emergence –Aseglio (1862) stated that we already created Italy, now we should create Italians (Aseglio, as quoted in Bespalova, 2016, p. 265). If it was talked of ethno-cultural formation of the nation - organic and natural, then rather a promoted creation of necessary "ideology" as on it there was a socio-cultural inquiry (Lyubashits, Mamychev, Uvarova, Artyukhin,&Chapurko, 2017).


History of formation of the Russian nation is an emergence of the Russian people as *natural* cultural and historical community and orthodox civilization. What ideology would not arise during various historical eras - it is necessary to recognize, it, to some extent reflected inquiry of the people (in any case - its parts). The inquiry was a miscellaneous - on the dominating values of socialism, liberalism, conservatism and other ideological and political orientations (Lyubashits et al, 2017).

However, irrespective of an ideological context real existence of Russians, preservation of cultural property of the nation always remained the most important condition of preservation of the Russian civilization (and during the Soviet, and Post-Soviet periods). The alien ideology was always rejected as opposed to "the Russian national idea" which is constantly flickering in the history of the Russian statehood sooner or later. Memory of the Russian soul or "living memory" of the people was much closer to the national idea, than liberal, class and any other ideological principles. Such memory contained in itself and freedom limited to conscience; and "the truth on the earth", both service and many other the values, major for the Russian person, but in traditional perception.

MATERIAL AND METHOD

The past as an object of cultural and historical memory is very in detail studied in the most various measurements - " frames of memory", "the art of remembering", "not passing past", "memory of war", "the remembering culture", "symbolical figures of memory", "commemorative culture", "policy of memory and oblivion", media culture of historical memory (figure1) - these and many other problems are already comprehended by the western and domestic schools of sciences.

Figure 1: Different forms of investigating historical memory in texts



Studying of historical memory in modern scientific tradition has one widespread methodological problem - unavailability of researchers to perceive memory out of a metaphorical concept.

In the current research, in order to collect data, the national memory in the form of a structure was studied. Based on this, first we tried to determine how the mechanism of national memory works in Russia, then to decide the role of ideologies and philosophy in this process. Afterwards analyze that why some memories, in contrast to the prevailing national ideology, are still alive, and ultimately what are the limitations of national memory creation. Based on this structure, the present research was carried out analytically and judicially.

RESULTS

The purpose of revival of national memory (overcoming "unconsciousness") is *solidarity* of the Russian society. Constancy of our vital relations in many respects is defined by compression/expansion of time (special perception of the present) when need of the person for restoration of communication with the past amplifies or weakens. During transformation of society time contracts, the distance between time intervals is reduced, "past" appears closer, than during the stability periods. Such past interests and unites the people.

Keen interest in memory as to social ideas of the past has the different reasons: attention to memories of participants and victims of the greatest tragedies of the

twentieth century - World War II, ethnic and political genocide, repressions; anniversary and memorial occasions; the fight for group and political interests including the necessary images of the past, etc. (Savelyeva, 2006).

In the conceptual plan at the western school of sciences the provision that the past is a design which is built in the present became conventional and is an object of manipulative technologies of the imperious elite presenting to citizens an image, convenient for it, and a form of the past within historical consciousness. Not absolutely so.

It is possible to tell that memories of any people exist in two measurements: as "debt" ("has to remember"), something ordered from above - in this case memory (as a construct), has the laws and the reality and "living memory" can change ("remembers contrary to everything") - such process of a remembering is connected with tradition, its stream is infinite, it is objective and practically does not give in to oblivion. A frames of artificial or organized memory is mobile while "living memory" holds a national kernel in the basis in remembrance and being inevitably updated, promotes preservation of the nation and a civilization. "Living" national memory or memory of the Russian soul cannot almost be changed. Thousand-year history of formation of national meanings of existence determined its steady content until there are the Russian people.

Not incidentally - "creators of a new, socialist system in Russia were neither smaller, nor big doctrinaires, than current organizers of reforms (reforms 90th. - traditional beliefs). Too was not pleasant to them *the traditional type of the Russian person* which got to them in inheritance (italics - traditional beliefs)" (Panarin, 2006).The traditional type of the Russian person sets the tone in the maintenance of national memory in any times, especially at the time of wars and revolutions.

Sociocultural characteristics of memory have a direct bearing on cultural space, time in perception of the person - the Russian memory, French, Japanese, American - it is possible to find expression of this identity of a remembering-forgetting and in national literature, especially, in national culture - sayings, proverbs, chastushkas (Baranov,Mamychev,Ovchinnikov, Komarov, & Samoylichenko, 2017).

Memory of the Russian soul includes also memory of war, history of victories and defeats in the most terrible wars of mankind. The code of honor of the Russian officer acts as the best reference point for revival of domestic forms of organized patriotic memory.

What wars remain in national memory? Whether it is possible to take from area of "oblivion" of reminiscence of war and to make them our urgent past?

The state initiative - to actualize memory of the I World war, "the forgotten war" was a few years ago designated. According to the President Vladimir Putin, this war was forgotten because of unwillingness of the Bolshevist management to remember own national treachery which defined the result of war. On August 1, since 2013, becomes day of remembrance of the Russian soldiers - it is date of the entry of Russia in war (other member countries will honor memory of the dead on November 11 - in day of truce between Germany and the Entente).

Revival of memory of heroes of the I World war does not mean their "revival"; it is attempt of the power to return memory of heroics of this war to national memory. Return of memories- difficult process, impossible without "nostalgia" on the past, without judgment of recent loss. Forms of organized patriotic memory have to correspond to sociocultural inquiry of society (Bespalova, 2016).

The I World war is not so close in time, again "to play" the past and to inhale life in the historical and cultural heritage accompanying this period of the Russian history - it is not so simple. The initiative of return of memory of "the forgotten war" out of doubts - is patriotic, but for its realization "people have to want to write, read, and remove about this war …" (Malinova, 2014, p.6).

Memorization of cultural heritage in modern Russia appeared directly the national memory (memory as a cultural code) connected with a problem of revival. National memory is offered to be considered as memory which will be organized in line with formation of national identity and corresponds to the sociocultural inquiry arising in society.Memory "not just proceeds, but has to be tried to get, established, be reported and acquired in a new way every time" (Assman, 2004, p.35) that demands its institutionalization in new state and political forms. The state institutes during the periods of bitter political struggle broadcast various versions of cultural and historical memory that leads to the competition of groups of memory in the society.

One of widespread ways of transfer of memory is communications. Communicative means (the speech, the letter, music, the press, telegraph, phone, radio, cinema, the Internet) form national memory differently, depending on the social order, a political regime, the dominating values, etc. Quite so there are conflict versions of memory, each of which during transformation of society can apply for the status of national memory. Thus, in all spheres of cultural activity during the periods of serious social changes (theater, cinema and so forth) it is possible to notice a sharp antagonism of these ideological and political preferences - "cultural war" (Assman, 2004).

Along with a remembering, it is important also forgetting - when certain elements of memory are forced out from the active use to the area of oblivion, there is new "a set of memories which is followed by emergence of a certain set of silently divided defaults" (Assman, 2004).

The "Memory framework" or limits of memory caused by an existential factor are washed away during social changes. Oblivion becomes by the society dominating in the conditions of loss of the national identity and is explained by "disappearance or loss of a part of this framework" (Assman, 2004).I

n a condition of unconsciousness the nation loses reference points, the policy of memory and oblivion can be practically any - to react to violations of limits of "living" national memory there is nobody. There is a risk of disappearance of the carrier of memory.

The policy of memory and oblivion in Post-Soviet Russia Nationalized new meanings of memorial culture to which earlier or due attention was not paid or they in general were buried in oblivion and are even condemned (images of statesmen, tsars, historical events). Complexity was in how to place accents what events to return to national memory and what - again to bury in oblivion.

M. Halbvaks (1928) who created the theory of cultural memory carefully treated history - where the past is not worried, begins history anymore and, further - "History begins, as a rule, only in that point where the tradition comes to an end and social memory" breaks up (Assman, 2004).Judgment of history as significant *(not any)* past really happens during destruction of tradition. Its preservation also requires new reconsideration of the historical past. *Considerably* it is possible to renew significant memories of the nation (the Russian people) only concerning the remote past which especially does not concern the inhabitant in the present.

Cultural memory allows to record the past moments when it is turned in symbolical figures to which reminiscence is attached ("I will roll the homeland into an egg" - Yu. Kuznetsov - 2013).

Defilement and destruction of symbols which were associated with "the Soviet era" became one of tendencies of memorial culture of Post-Soviet Russia. Cultural war, war with monuments, war of symbols not completed and is conditioned by the political confrontation of Russia of the 1990s and, even, earlier world outlook opposition of Westerners and Slavophiles in which it is looked through various manifestation of love to Russia. Love "chaadayevsky" free, critical, based on aspiration to the truth and love disinterested, inexplicable nothing, in berdyaevsky understanding of love "for nothing" and love "before" judgment of feats and greatness of Russia.

"Ubibeneibi patria - this saying received various connotation, but irrespective of it, quite reflects positive emotional perception of the fatherland as *only* home. "Power" and "homeland" are not identical. In race for power often forgot about Russia, destroying its major spiritual shrines. Destruction of cultural and historical heritage became an integral part of this fight as was a possibility of weakening of the opponent by deprivation of its religious and cultural point of support (Mordovcev,

Mamychev, Bezmaternykh, Komarov & Shalyapin, 2017). The tool attitude towards national memory during the Soviet period deprived the people of the most significant spiritual shrines. Though the Soviet cultural heritage was at the same time created and in its contents the Russian national kernel was looked through.

Change of political faces of the fatherland, war, revolution led to destruction of a huge part of cultural heritage for ideological reasons or by simple negligence to cultural and historical monuments. History of restoration of cultural and historical monuments gives an idea of valuable priorities of the nation, than historical and cultural heritage in itself to a large extent.

The role of cultural heritage and tradition in modern opposition of ideologies practically did not change. The historical and cultural heritage as the most important storage of historical memory is used for restoration of cultural continuity or, on the contrary, for destruction of habitual stereotypes. Cultural monuments act in two measurements: as carriers of historical memory/oblivion and as carriers of history of their storage/destruction. The last measurement is important for judgment of the valuable importance of monuments in society. On condition of their restoration (temples, cultural and religious shrines) their inherent value is confirmed.

The campaign of dismantle of the Soviet monuments which began in the 90th years (To Dzerzhinsky, Kalinin) reflected history of change of the ideas, stereotypes and values and history of change of the political order for cultural property of the nation.

At the same time there was a perpetuation of memory of the victims of political terrorism - it is the huge block of memorial culture of Post-Soviet Russia. Commemorative the practices prisons, places of mass burials of the victims of political repressions get to space the camp. On the one hand, the tendency reflected expectations of one part of the Russian society which ancestors were repressed and destroyed (conditionally - "a white face of patriotism"), on the other hand - quite strong pole in the Russian political space was and is now - "a red face of patriotism" - representatives of which do not see in still not really remote past of such tragic element. For the last - the heroics of the Soviet era eclipses any tragic element (especially as formally repressions were condemned at the 20th congress of the CPSU). How to master the general historical and cultural heritage in the conditions of such opposition? What heritage to leave without successors and to what to return them?

The policy of memory in the Soviet Russia was directed to oblivion in relation to memory of the victims of terror (which the Soviet power during the period from 1917 to the 1950th years practiced) and members of their families (Svyatoslavsky, 1989).

In Post-Soviet Russia the memorialization of the victims "red" and "white terror" was carried out some time in line with ideological opposition "red" and "white", proved by historic facts of fratricidal civil war. In practice it turned out so that the memorialization of the victims of "red terror" is presented less that set temptation of installation of monuments "white". The side between perpetuation of memory of the victims of "red terror" and glorification of traitors was very thin. This tendency is not overcome yet.

Nobody realized in the 90-2000th yet that this opposition should be overcome, first of all, in the field of delicate formation of national memory and in the sphere of commemorative culture. In Civil war there are no winners and won, it is split of the uniform people, fight for different political faces of the Fatherland - a tragic lesson which it is necessary to leave adequately. The best way of a new memorialization of the Red and White movement will probably common be the general Civil memorials (as a monument of Consent and Reconciliation in Novocherkassk) or construction of temples, chapels on places of mass burials will become perhaps (as Church of All Saints at the former Cossack cemetery in Omsk).

During the Soviet period of development of the Russian statehood the policy of memory and oblivion was actively developed. Concerning the imperial past "black myths" about the slave humility of the Russian people connected with Orthodoxy about inability of tsars to manage grandiose victories in wars were created, rebels (Razin, Pugachyov) and everything were heroized, (Decembrists) protesting against the imperial power.

Now the situation is similar, valuable reference points only cardinally changed. "Dark pages" of national history, undoubtedly, effectively form historical memory, however for this purpose the nation has to have strength of spirit, immunity, otherwise revival of such subjects can destroy the weak people. During the periods of the weak, almost destroyed Russian national consciousness it is necessary to address such past which causes associations of "the enchanted space", the past which gives hope for the future.

In modern Russia interpretation of history changed that is connected with return to tradition - traditions of perception of the Russian power, God, a family, culture and history. However ideological opposition is not overcome yet and is carried out generally in fight of liberalism and the Russian traditionalism. The possibility of decrease in degree of a political conflictness seems *in formation of imperial patriotism (national or imperial memory), revival of memory of the Russian soul and the policy of memory and oblivion corresponding to sociocultural inquiry.*

Long ago there was a pressing need of the Russian person in "white myths" about Russia, in overcoming valuable opposition in the state, in finding of national unity not in the course of adoption of law on the Russian nation ("the law that dyshlo"),

and the unity found in a natural rush as reactions to the happening desecration of the Russian history and culture.

What past it is necessary to address to remove this opposition? Old Russian pagan, orthodox, imperial or federal, Soviet or pre-revolutionary? This row can be continued indefinitely. Designing of the Russian identity (political imagination) has to be connected with the appeal to the past through a reconstruction of cultural continuity (revival and folding of tradition). These processes go not without serious consequences because of ideological and political collision of various "groups of memory" when not just various shade has pictures of the past and, respectively, a present and the future, and in principle are irreconcilable.

In modern opposition of ideologies in line with political patriotism it is possible to allocate four forces conditionally: the liberal patriot, social patriotic, national patriots and Eurasians who differently comprehend the past, the present and the future of Russia. For the patriotic liberal it is significant the European image of Russia therefore selection of historical events, statesmen, symbols, myths, the ideas is connected with orientation to the western examples of culture, the critical relation to the power in various protest forms, priority value of freedom of the individual over interests of society, attempt to find democracy elements in the history of Russia (Popular assembly, the Novgorod republic). The problem of social inequality is offered to be solved from a position of granting equal starting opportunities to citizens, and further, already laws of the market will define winners and losers. Thus, *the tradition is not important*, the historical and cultural heritage is used selectively for justification of the European image of Russia, memory is a construct, and it is possible to create *any* representation in the relation to the past. For the Russian liberals, the past in general is not as important as the future. The historical past is not of special value because of denial of tradition as source of national memory.

This world outlook opposition of liberalism and the Russian traditionalism is the best of all A. Panarin designated: "… the Russian culture is still estimated according to this installation: as far as the culture can serve the converting purposes, build up unruly and converting characters and post-traditionalist type of behavior. From these positions it (culture a bus) is put on suspicion by current liberal critics. They accuse her of preservation of values of communal type, conformist and collectivist installations, rejection of initiative individualism" (Panarin, 2005, p.85).

Other three ideological and political orientations are in a condition of less sharp conflictness among them and, to a large extent, all together take a uniform position of rejection of liberalism.

For the social and patriotic environment (the CPRF, Just Russia, and the Homeland) the idea of social justice, equality, and a brotherhood is represented

important. The parallel between a communal and collectivist world order is drawn. The Russian person is a fighter for justice, for the truth on the earth. In this sense the subject of the organization of social inequality is comprehended from a position of material equality (the model was mastered in the Soviet Union). History, tradition, cultural and historical heritage are of huge value for social patriotic, however interpretation of historical events (for example, the conclusion of the Brest world or signing of the Belavezha Accords) will differ radically from a liberal position. Formation of national memory (the appeal to the concept "people", "working people") is not thought without the Soviet historical and cultural heritage and without continuity of eras - imperial, Soviet, Russian - differently the tradition is interrupted.

For a national patriotic range the wide structure of political forces is presented by both the Russian liberals, and social democrats, and conservatives, and directly Russian nationalists, Russia is not Europe and Eurasia. Russia an original orthodox civilization, it has the unique way. Special value is occupied by a problem of ethnocultural, national and civilization identity. Revival of Russia cannot be anonymous, the subject of policy, culture and history - the Russian people is important. National memory in this way has sacral measurement. The cultural heritage of an imperial era gains priority value for conservative traditionalists and the Russian nationalists.

For Eurasians, neoeurasians the mystical understanding of history, tradition, memory is important. Geopolitical measurement of the future Russian (Euroasian - is used as a synonym) civilizations depends on political will of national elite. Traditionalism is one of the most important world outlook fundamentals of the Euroasian ideology, however unacceptable, for example, for a national of patriots the Euroasian thesis that "Russia is Eurasia is, and Russians are the Eurasians". Along with recognition of inherent value of the Russian classics and traditional culture, Old Belief - not less significant for Eurasians current trends of urgent conservative art act.

Three last ideological and political forces, in principle, are in a condition of constructive dialogue and meet in the main thing - preservation of traditionalism, revival of imperial patriotism, memory of people or national memory. The Russian liberal public irreconcilably belongs to revival of the Russian heritage, traditional values, national memory, Orthodoxy, including all this antiquity and return to "Middle Ages".

CONCLUSIONS

At each political force the images of Russia, heroes and traitors, the reference points in the choice of significant cultural and historical heritage - it is not so simple to compromise. It is obviously possible to solve a problem at the level of state policy of memory and oblivion, taking into account the fact that three recent

ideological and political trends are within imperial patriotism and "national" memory.

This political opposition is fixed also at the state level in line with lobbying by political groups of the interests and in the international space within a cultural and civilization antagonism of the states. Thus, it is possible to talk about the arising competing interpretations of the ideas, stereotypes, symbols, myths and values. Who will come out in this opposition by the winner that also will set "tone" in interpretation of the past, present and future.

There is such phenomenon of "the ordered oblivion", the symbolizing act of socially approved oblivion and forgiveness of all that was made during the previous period, for the benefit of political consent and reconciliation. Russia knows similar examples (1605) when the difficult past is destroyed in favor of the past simple. Whether the Russian society is ready to the similar act? Possible versions of the contents of policy of memory and oblivion, at least three:

> - policy of memory and oblivion as the simplified past recognizing the imperial past (but partly passing the Soviet period with subjects of repressions as abnormal);
>
> - policy of memory and oblivion as ascertaining of the present (history of free Russia began in the 90th years);
>
> - policy of memory and oblivion as the complicated past with recognition of continuity of eras - imperial, Soviet, Russian. Selection of new symbolical figures of memory, the historical events demanding perpetuation in national memory, conceptual justification of a new memorization of cultural and historical heritage. In the last the essence of originally state policy of memory and oblivion of the corresponding live national memory seems.

Memory of the Russian soul once again disproves alien ideology (liberalism ideology), returning the Russian people in space of the national idea and a historical mission. Only it is necessary to manage to consider it. Elaboration of state policy of memory and oblivion is not thought out of an imperial paradigm, formation of national memory, revival of memory of the Russian soul.

Revival of national consciousness of the carrier of memory and culture, the Russian people through cultural and educational practices - a paramount problem of state policy of Russia, only when mechanisms of national memory will start working, there will be recognizable images of the Russian classics, the feat, hope and a habitual image of the Homeland will return again. Any forms of ideological oppositions can be resolved within a paradigm of the Russian world, the Russian civilization. The Russian face of patriotism has to unite "white" and "red".

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